Ending Secret Detentions

June 2004

human rights first
THE NEW NAME OF LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
**About Us**

For the past quarter century, Human Rights First (the new name of Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) has worked in the United States and abroad to create a secure and humane world by advancing justice, human dignity and respect for the rule of law. We support human rights activists who fight for basic freedoms and peaceful change at the local level; protect refugees in flight from persecution and repression; help build a strong international system of justice and accountability; and make sure human rights laws and principles are enforced in the United States and abroad.

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U.S. Operated Detention Facilities in the “War on Terror”

Afghanistan

**Disclosed**
- Collection Center at the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram.
- Detention facility in Kandahar (an “intermediate” site, where detainees await transport to Bagram).
- Approximately 20 “outlying transient sites” (used to hold detainees until they may be evacuated either to Kandahar or Bagram).

**Suspected**
Detention facilities in:
- Asadabad *
- Kabul *
- Jalalabad *
- Gardez *
- Khost *
- CIA interrogation facility at Bagram
- CIA interrogation facility in Kabul (known as “the Pit”)

*These sites may be part of the approximately 20 “outlying transient sites.”

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

**Disclosed**
- U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay

Iraq

**Disclosed**
- Abu Ghraib (near Baghdad)
- Camp Cropper (near the Baghdad Airport)
- Camp Bucca (near Basra)
- Nine facilities under division or brigade command
- Facilities run by military divisions:
  - 1st Infantry Division DIF (Tikrit)

Legal issues in cases of both disclosed and undisclosed locations:

**Disclosed**
In the cases where detention facilities are well known, there is no information or only conflicting information about how many individuals are held there, troubling information about inadequate provision of notice to families about the fact of detainees’ capture and condition, and unclear or conflicting statements about detainees’ legal status and rights. While the ICRC has visited these facilities, their visits have been undermined in ways contrary to the letter and spirit of binding law.

In other cases, the existence of the detention facility is acknowledged by the United States (as in the case of more than a dozen detention facilities in Iraq) but very little else is known, particularly the nature of the detainees’ legal status and rights.

**Suspected**
These are cases where the detention facility itself is not officially acknowledged but has been reported by multiple sources. In the absence of official acknowledgment, there is of course no information on how many might be held at such facilities, whether their families have been notified, why they are held, or whether the ICRC has access to them (indeed, the ICRC has stated publicly that they do not).
• 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Al Fallujah)
• 1st Cavalry Division (Baghdad)
• 1st Armored Division (Baghdad)
• Multi-National Division-South East (Az Zubayr)
• Facilities run by military brigades:
  • Dayyarah West (Multi-National Brigade - North)
  • Tal Afar (Multi-National Brigade - North)
  • Al Hillah (Multi-National Division - Center South)
  • Wasit (Multi-National Division - Center South)
• In addition, there are a number of “brigade holding areas in division sectors” where detainees may be held up to 72 hours before transfer to Division facilities.
• Ashraf Camp. Ashraf Camp is a detention facility for Mujahideen-E-Khalq (MEK), an Iraqi based organization seeking to overthrow the government in Iran. Ashraf Camp was disclosed as a detention site for MEK detainees in February 2004, but as of June 11, 2004, the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) refused to discuss the status or location of the MEK detainees.

Pakistan
Suspected
• Kohat (near the border of Afghanistan)
• Alizai

Diego Garcia
Suspected
• United States and United Kingdom officials deny repeated press reports indicating that at least some individuals are being detained on the British possession of Diego Garcia, including, at one time, Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin), the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah.

Jordan
Suspected
• Al Jafr Prison (CIA interrogation facility)

United States
Disclosed
• Naval Consolidated Brig (Charleston, South Carolina). This is where the U.S. Government is detaining at least three individuals as “enemy combatants”: two U.S. citizens, Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, as well as Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari national residing in the United States.

Suspected
• U.S. Naval Ships: USS Bataan and USS Peleliu.
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I. Introduction

More than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. Many others have met a different fate. Put it this way, they’re no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.

President George W. Bush
State of the Union Address
February 4, 2003

In April, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the cases of Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi – both U.S. citizens who have been held in military detention facilities for more than two years. One Justice wondered aloud how the Court could be sure that government interrogators were not abusing these detainees. You just have to “trust the executive to make the kind of quintessential military judgments that are involved in things like that,” said Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement. Later that evening, CBS’s 60 Minutes broadcast the first shocking photographs of U.S. troops torturing Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq.

The photos from Abu Ghraib have made a policy of “trust us” obsolete. But they are only the most visible symptoms of a much larger and more disturbing systemic illness. Since the attacks of September 11, the United States has established a network of detention facilities around the world used to detain thousands of individuals captured in the “war on terrorism.” Information about this system – particularly the location of U.S. detention facilities, how many are held within them, on what legal basis they are held, and who has access to the prisoners – emerges in a piecemeal way, if at all, and then largely as a result of the work of investigative reporters and other non-governmental sources. The official secrecy surrounding U.S. practices has made conditions ripe for illegality and abuse.

Several of these facilities, including the U.S. military bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, are well known. The existence of these facilities – and the fact of unlawful conduct within them – have been widely publicized and well documented. Nonetheless, there is still no or only conflicting information about how many individuals are held there, troubling information about inadequate provision of notice to families about the fact of detainees’ capture and condition, and unclear or conflicting statements about detainees’ legal status and rights. While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has visited these facilities, their visits have been undermined in ways contrary to the letter and spirit of binding law.
In addition, there are detention facilities that multiple sources have reported are maintained by the United States in various officially undisclosed locations, including facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, on the British possession of Diego Garcia, and on U.S. war ships at sea. U.S. Government officials have alluded to detention facilities in undisclosed locations, declining to deny their existence or refusing to comment on reports of their existence. A Department of Defense official told Human Rights First in June 2004 that while Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo’s Camp Echo were open to discussion, “as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on other facilities.” Similarly, Captain Bruce Frame, a U.S. army spokesman from centcom, the unified military command that covers Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, told Human Rights First only that there “may or may not” be detention centers in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan in centcom’s area of responsibility.

The Known Unknowns

What is unknown about this detention system still outweighs what is known about it. But facilities within it share in common key features that – while having unclear benefits in the nation’s struggle against terrorism – make inappropriate detention and abuse not only likely, but virtually inevitable.

First, each of these facilities is maintained in either partial or total secrecy. For the past half-century, the United States has considered itself bound by international treaties and U.S. military regulations that prohibit such blanket operating secrecy. Yet in this conflict, the ICRC – which the United States has long respected as a positive force in upholding international humanitarian law – has repeatedly sought and been denied access to these facilities. As the ICRC recently noted in a public statement:

> Beyond Bagram and Guantanamo Bay, the ICRC is increasingly concerned about the fate of an unknown number of people captured as part of the so-called global war on terror and held in undisclosed locations. For the ICRC, obtaining information on these detainees and access to them is an important humanitarian priority and a logical continuation of its current detention work in Bagram and Guantanamo Bay.

Indeed, Human Rights First has been unable to identify any official list of U.S. detention facilities abroad employed in the course of the “war on terrorism.” There is likewise no public accounting of how many are detained or for what reason they are held. And there has been a disturbing absence of serious congressional oversight of both known and undisclosed detention facilities.

Second, these facilities have thrived in an environment in which the highest levels of U.S. civilian leadership have sought legal opinions aimed at circumventing the application of domestic and international rules governing arrest and detention. Where it would have once seemed crystal clear to military commanders and on-the-ground military custodians alike that the Geneva Conventions governed the arrest and detention of individuals caught up in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this Administration has challenged the applicability of those rules. In several recently leaked legal opinions from White House Counsel, and the Departments of Defense and Justice, it has become clear that some in the Administration have given a green light to the wholesale violation of these rules.
As a result, it remains unclear what legal status has been assigned to those being detained at these U.S.-controlled facilities. Are they prisoners of war, civilians who took a direct part in hostilities (who the Administration calls “unlawful combatants”), or are they suspected of criminal violations under civilian law? The Administration has applied no clear system for defining their status. It also is unclear under many circumstances which U.S. agency is ultimately responsible for their arrest or the conditions of their confinement. And it now seems that U.S. military and intelligence agencies are involved in their interrogation, as well as civilian or foreign government contractors to whom aspects of detention and interrogation has been outsourced. It is likewise unclear to whom a family member or legal representative can appeal to challenge the basis for their continued detention.

Finally, the U.S. government has failed to provide prompt notice to families of those captured that their family member is in custody, much less information about their health or whereabouts. In such cases, the families of individuals removed to such unknown locations have had no opportunity to challenge detentions that may continue for extended periods. For example, Saifullah Paracha, according to information his family received from the ICRC, has been detained at Bagram Air Force Base for more than 11 months. His wife and children remain in the dark, not only of the reason for his detention, but also when they can expect Mr. Paracha to be released or tried. Other individuals captured more than a year ago remain in detention at other undisclosed locations. The lack of information to family members about these detainees violates U.S. legal obligations and sets a negative precedent for treatment that may directed at U.S. soldiers in the future. It also engenders great anguish and suffering on the part of the families of detainees – no less than did the practice of “forcible disappearance” in past decades – while engendering enormous hostility toward the United States.

In the Interest of National Security

The Administration has argued that, faced with the unprecedented security threat posed by terrorist groups “of global reach,” it has had to resort to preventive detention and interrogation of those suspected to have information about possible terrorist attacks. According to the Defense and Justice Departments, a key purpose of these indefinite detentions is to promote national security by developing detainees as sources of intelligence. And while much of what goes on at these detention facilities is steeped in secrecy, intelligence agents insist that “[w]e’re getting great info almost every day.”

Whatever the value of intelligence information obtained in these facilities – and there is reason to doubt the reliability of intelligence information gained only in the course of prolonged incommunicado detention – there is no legal or practical justification for refusing to report comprehensively on the number and location of these detainees – or to fail to provide the identities of detainees to the ICRC, detainees’ families, their counsel, or to others having a legitimate interest in the information (unless a wish to the contrary has been manifested by the persons concerned).

The United States is of course within its power to ask questions and to cultivate local sources of information. And the United States certainly has the power to detain – in keeping with its authority under the Constitution and applicable international law – those who are actively engaged in hostilities against the United States, or those suspected of committing or conspiring
to commit acts against the law. But it does not have the power to establish a secret system of off-shore prisons beyond the reach of supervision, accountability, or law.

Finally, even if some valuable information is being obtained, there are standards on the treatment of prisoners that cannot be set aside. The United States was founded on a core set of beliefs that have served the nation very well over two centuries. Among the most basic of these beliefs is that torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is wrong; arbitrary detention is an instrument of tyranny; and no use of government power should go unchecked. The refusal to disclose the identity of detainees, prolonged incommunicado detention, the use of secret detention centers, and the exclusion of judicial or ICRC oversight combine to remove fundamental safeguards against torture and ill-treatment and arbitrary detention. Current practices which violate these principles must be stopped immediately.

The abuses at Abu Ghraib underscore the reason why, since the United States’ founding, Americans have rejected the idea of a government left to its own devices and acting on good faith in favor of a government based on checks and balances and anchored to the rule of law. As James Madison noted, “[a] popular Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy.”16 This nation’s history has repeatedly taught the value of public debate and discourse. To cite one example, the United States learned this 30 years ago when a series of congressional investigations uncovered widespread, secret domestic spying by the CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Army – revelations whose impact on the intelligence agencies was, in former CIA Director Stansfield Turner’s words, “devastating.”17

We should be clear – the United States has important and legitimate interests in gathering intelligence information and in keeping some of this information secret. But we are not demanding the public release of any information that would compromise these interests. What we are calling for is an official accounting – to Congress and to the ICRC – of the number, nationality, legal status, and place of detention of all those the United States currently holds. We ask that all of these places of detention be acknowledged and open to inspection by the ICRC, and that the names of all detainees be made available promptly to the ICRC and to others with a legitimate interest in this information. Neither logic nor law supports the continued withholding of the most basic information about the United States’ global system of secret detention. Trust is plainly no longer enough.

Michael Posner and Deborah Pearlstein
New York
June 17, 2004
II. The Known Unknowns

[A] large number of terrorist suspects were not able to launch an attack last year because they are in prison. More than 3,000 of them are al-Qaida terrorists and they were arrested in over 100 countries.

Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black
Remarks on the Release of the Annual Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 Report
April 30, 2003

While the United States has made it clear that it has arrested and detained thousands of individuals in the “war on terrorism” since September 11, 2001, it has provided scant information about the nature of this global detention system – information that is critical to preventing incidents of illegality and abuse.

In some cases, the detention facility itself is well known – as in the case of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, or the U.S. Air Force Base at Bagram, Afghanistan – but there is no or only conflicting information about how many individuals are held there, troubling information about inadequate provision of notice to families about the fact of detainees’ capture and condition, and unclear or conflicting statements about detainees’ legal status and rights. While the ICRC has visited these facilities, their visits have been undermined in ways contrary to the letter and spirit of binding law.

In other cases, the existence of the detention facility is acknowledged by the United States – as in the case of more than a dozen detention facilities in Iraq – but very little else is known, particularly the nature of the detainees’ legal status and rights. And families in Iraq tell too many stories about loved ones arrested by coalition forces there without families understanding why – family members who then effectively disappear.

Finally, there are cases in which the existence of the detention facility itself is not officially acknowledged but has been reported by multiple sources – for example, Kohat and Alizai in Pakistan; Jalalabad, Asadabad, and Kabul in Afghanistan;\(^8\) the U.S. Naval Base on Diego Garcia; and U.S. military ships, particularly the USS Bataan and the USS Peleliu.\(^9\) In the absence of official acknowledgment of such undisclosed locations, there is of course no information on how many might be held at such facilities, whether their families have been notified, why they are held, or whether the ICRC has access to them (indeed, as noted above, the ICRC has stated publicly that it does not).
U.S. concerns for the security of lawful detention facilities and for force protection are of course appropriate. But it is contrary to U.S. law and policy that information be withheld or classified without a basis in law. As the Federation of American Scientists recently emphasized in a letter to the Information Security Oversight Office expressing concern that General Taguba’s Abu Ghraib report had been inappropriately classified: “[T]he executive order that governs national security classification states that ‘In no case shall information be classified in order to... conceal violations of law.’” More to the point, it is unclear either how disclosing, in a comprehensive and regular manner, the following basic information endangers legitimate U.S. missions abroad:

- How many individuals are currently held by the United States at military or intelligence detention facilities;
- What legal status these detainees have been accorded (e.g. as prisoners of war, “unlawful combatants,” or some other status) and what process is followed to determine this status;
- Whether the detainees have received unrestricted visits from the ICRC;
- Whether the immediate families of the detainees have been notified of their loved ones’ location, status, and condition of health.

Mohammed Ismail Agha

Mohammed Ismail Agha, now 15 years old, spent 14 months of his life in U.S. custody, first in Afghanistan and later in Camp Iguana at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Mr. Agha comes from Durabin, an isolated agricultural village in Afghanistan. According to Mr. Agha, Afghan soldiers captured him and turned him over to U.S. soldiers, who flew him to Bagram Air Force Base, where he spent more than six weeks. Mr. Agha described Bagram as a “very bad place.” Guards prevented him from sleeping by yelling and kicking his door. At Bagram, Mr. Agha was interrogated every day and questioned about his affiliation with the Taliban or other Islamic groups. During his interrogations, he stated his interrogators “made me stand partway, with my knees bent, for one or two hours. Sometimes I couldn’t bear it any more and I fell down, but they made me stand that way some more.” He was told if he did not confess he would be taken to Guantanamo Bay. After six weeks at Bagram, Mr. Agha was hooded, his wrists and ankles chained, and flown to Guantanamo Bay where he spent more than a year. While in Guantanamo, Mr. Agha, being the eldest son and major support for his family, was worried about them. Despite writing a few letters home, his family was unaware of his whereabouts for almost a year. His father “went to all the work sites in the towns” to no avail, eventually concluding his son “must be dead.” Mr. Agha was finally released on January 29, 2004.
Afghanistan

According to CENTCOM, the U.S. unified military command with operational control of U.S. combat forces in the region, coalition forces have only one general detention facility in Afghanistan: the Collection Center at the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram. An acknowledged U.S. detention facility in Kandahar is considered an “intermediate” site, where detainees await transportation to Bagram. In addition, CENTCOM acknowledges a series of “outlying transient sites” that are used to hold detainees until they may be evacuated either to Kandahar on their way to the detention facility at Bagram, or directly to the detention facility at Bagram. Some reports put the total number of these facilities at 20.

Non-governmental organizations and press have reported the existence of detention facilities in Asadabad, Kabul, and Jalalabad, and two under the command of Special Forces in Gardez and Khost. In addition to the detention facility under military command at Bagram Air Force Base, numerous sources cite an interrogation facility under CIA control at Bagram as well. A recent press report revealed a primary CIA interrogation facility to be in Kabul, known as the Pit.

Until the events of the past few months, the Department of Defense had taken the position that even the number of people detained by the United States in Afghanistan was classified. In response to a request by Human Rights First on March 27, 2004, the Department of Defense answered that “[t]he number of detainees within Afghanistan is classified due to ongoing military operations and force protection concerns.”

Saifullah Paracha

Saifullah Paracha’s family understands that he was brought to Bagram Air Force Base in July 2003. Mr. Paracha is a U.S. permanent resident. He is a Pakistani citizen who came to the United States for his post-college studies in 1971. He lived in the U.S. until the mid-1980s, when he and his family decided to move back to Pakistan. Along with an American partner, Charles Anteby, he maintained an import/export company dealing in exporting clothing to the United States from Pakistan. According to Mr. Paracha’s wife, Mr. Anteby set up a meeting with Kmart in Bangkok and asked Mr. Paracha to fly down for the meeting. Mr. Paracha boarded the Air Thai plane to Bangkok, but the driver sent to collect Mr. Paracha at the Bangkok airport reported that Mr. Paracha had not deplaned. Air Thai confirmed that Mr. Paracha boarded the plane. Mr. Paracha’s family received a letter from the ICRC in August 2003, more than six weeks after he went missing, informing them that he was in Bagram Air Force Base. The family was given his prisoner number. They have since received additional letters.

My most dearest Ammi, Farhat, Muneeza, Mustafa and Zahra,
Assalam-o-Alaikum

I pray to Almighty for your welfare, health and happiness. May Allah keep you in His safe custody. Today after a while I received two of your letters dated 24th September and October 01, 03 and am replying immediately. I can only write letters when the ICRC people are here, and in their presence, and as fast as possible. Their visits are their own planning and then the letters are being examined by the US Authority. This is why it takes time to reach you or me. I am very happy, satisfied and proud of you that you’re going to the office and taking care of the family – Allah bless you and reward you here and Thereafter. Also my worries are over when I received your letters about the family, Uzair and business details. I am very happy to hear about Muniza. Please give her my love also. Mustafa did not reply on the issue of exercise. Please remind him and tell him not to fight with Zahra.

Letter of November 17, 2003 from Saif Paracha to his family, as transmitted through the International Committee of the Red Cross, and translated by his family.
Despite these stated classification restrictions, the Defense Department more recently offered that there are currently 358 individuals detained by the United States in Afghanistan. Other reports put the number at about 380. The ICRC has counted “some 300” detainees at Bagram as of May 2004.

The ICRC has expressed its concern as the periods of detention at Bagram increase that “the U.S. authorities have not resolved the questions of [the detainees’] legal status and of the applicable legal framework.” Indeed, the ICRC has had limited access to the Bagram facility, and has been able to meet with certain detainees after they have been held in Bagram for a few weeks. The ICRC also reportedly visited Kandahar between December 2001 and June 2002, when it understood that the Kandahar detention center was only a transit post on the way to Bagram. However, evidence emerged more recently that the United States continued to hold some suspects for longer periods at Kandahar, and the ICRC asked to be allowed to visit the center again. After considering the ICRC’s request for three weeks, the Pentagon recently agreed to begin making arrangements to allow ICRC access again. It is still unclear whether the ICRC will have access to other detention centers (transient or otherwise) in Afghanistan.

From published interviews with those released from detention facilities in Afghanistan, and discussions with family members of a detainee held at Bagram, there does not appear to be a family notification policy. For example, Abdul Gehafouz Akhundzada was arrested in February 2003, and reportedly taken to Bagram Air Force Base. Despite appeals to the United States and local government officials, as of late 2003, no further information of Mr. Akhundzada was available. The family of another detainee at Bagram Air Force Base, Saifullah Paracha, was notified of his detention at Bagram not by the United States, but by the ICRC. Despite repeated attempts, Human Rights First was unable to discern whether the Department of Defense had a family notification policy for detainees in Afghanistan.

**Iraq**

*Despite some improvement, hundreds of families have had to wait anxiously for weeks and sometimes months before learning the whereabouts of their arrested family members. Many families travel for weeks throughout the country from one place of internment to another in search of their relatives and often come to learn about their whereabouts informally (through released detainees) or when the person deprived of his liberty is released and returns home.*

Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Iraq

February 2004

The Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) confirms three main detention facilities in Iraq for security detainees: Abu Ghraib near Baghdad, Camp Cropper near the Baghdad Airport, and Camp Bucca near Basra in southern Iraq. In addition, the CPIC Press Office detailed 9 additional facilities under division or brigade command. Additional facilities run by military divisions are:

- 1st Infantry Division DIF (Tikrit)
- 1st Marine Expeditionary Force DIF (Al Fallujah)
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- 1st Cavalry Division DIF (Baghdad)
- 1st Armored Division DIF (Baghdad)
- Multi-National Division-South East (Az Zubayr)

In areas without division internment facilities, military brigades oversee the detention facilities. These facilities are in or near the towns of:

- Dayyarah West (Multi-National Brigade - North)
- Tal Afar (Multi-National Brigade - North)
- Al Hillah (Multi-National Division - Center South)
- Wasit (Multi-National Division - Center South)

In addition, there are “brigade holding areas in division sectors...where detainees may be held up to 72 hours before transfer to Division facilities.”

The twelve facilities listed by CPIC conflict with remarks made by General Geoffrey Miller, Deputy Commanding General, Detention Operations in Iraq, who stated in May 2004 that there were 14 detention facilities in Iraq. Indeed, lists of detention facilities in Iraq disclosed by non-governmental organizations identify additional facilities to the ones provided by the CPIC.

The U.S. Government’s account of the nature of the legal status of detainees in Iraq has varied substantially. In April 2003, the Department of Defense, appropriately, stated that it was holding detainees either as prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, or as civilian internees under the Fourth Geneva Convention. By May 2003, the U.S. Government seemed to introduce a new category of detainees—“unlawful combatants.” The category of unlawful combatants seems to have eventually been dropped, and on September 16, 2003, General Janis

Saddam Saleh Al Rawi

Saddam Saleh Al Rawi, a former political prisoner under Saddam Hussein, was detained for almost four months in Abu Ghraib by U.S.-led Coalition Forces until he was released on March 28, 2004. He reports that he was arrested without being given an explanation of the charges against him. According to Mr. Al Rawi’s testimony, he spent the first few days of his detention in solitary confinement. Following that, he was removed to another location within the prison where he was interrogated and tortured for 18 consecutive days. During this time, he was repeatedly kicked, beaten, and had two of his teeth knocked out. He received one meal every 12 hours. Prison guards threatened him with dogs and stood on his hands. The soldiers threatened to rape him if he did not provide the soldiers with information. At other times, they threatened to send him to Guantanamo Bay if he did not comply. His interrogation and torture often lasted for up to 23 hours. Following his interrogation sessions, he was often prevented from sleeping due to loud music. Before a visit by the ICRC in January 2004, he reports that he was warned that if he said anything to the ICRC that the prison guards did not like, “he would never live to regret it.” When the ICRC arrived, he did not say anything to them of the conditions of his confinement, answering most questions, “I don’t know.” He was kept in solitary confinement for approximately three months before he was released.
Karpinski, commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade announced that more than 4,000 detainees in Iraq were being held as “security detainees,” separate from prisoners of war and criminal detainees;\(^5\) in contrast, security detainees were those who had attacked U.S. forces or were suspected of involvement in or planning of such attacks.\(^4\) It was the first time the term was used to describe Iraqi prisoners.\(^5\)

The U.S. Government’s accounting of detainees in Iraq has significantly increased over time, while the number of those held under recognized lawful categories has drastically diminished. In May 2003, the U.S. Government indicated it was holding 2000 detainees, of which most were prisoners of war, along with 500 unlawful combatants.\(^6\) In late July 2003, 1100 detainees were held as prisoners of war and “high value detainees.”\(^7\) With the introduction of the security detainee category in September 2003, the number of prisoners of war plummeted to 300, while the number of total detainees increased to 10,000 with 4400 security detainees and 5300 criminal detainees.\(^8\) In early January 2004, the total number of detainees was approximately 12,000, while the number of prisoners of war dropped to 20.\(^9\) The number of security detainees ballooned as of June 2004, when the Coalition Authority confirmed it was detaining over 6300 security detainees.\(^6\) Of the more than 6300 security detainees, more than 3000 are detained in Abu Ghraib, the largest detention facility under Coalition authority in Iraq.\(^6\)

On June 13, 2004, the Coalition Authority pledged to release or transfer to Iraqi control as many as 1,400 prisoners throughout the country, but would continue to hold between 4,000 and 5,000 people as security detainees.\(^6\) While the reduction in numbers is a positive step, handing over detainees to Iraqi control without adequate disclosure or certainty of legal process simply replicates the secrecy and prisoner vulnerability marking present detention practices.

In addition to security detainees, prisoners of war, and criminal detainees, the Coalition Authority separately detains members of the Mujahideen-E-Khalq (MEK), an Iraqi based organization seeking to overthrow the government in Iran. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Coalition Operations, in a press briefing in early January 2004 commented that the status of almost 3000 MEK detainees was being determined.\(^6\) There was no mention of their legal status or under what authority the United States was detaining them. The Administration then confirmed the detention of the MEK in a separate detention facility, Ashraf Camp.\(^6\) In June 2004, the CPIC

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**Wisam Adnan Hameed Ismaeel Hussain**

The Christian Peacemakers Team, a religious organization working in Iraq since 2002, reports that Wisam Hussain, a 22-year-old taxi driver from Al Dhoura near Baghdad, disappeared August 7, 2003. When he failed to return home, his family searched a number of hospitals and Abu Ghraib prison. They were assured he was not at Abu Ghraib because though his name was in the prison files, it was not in the computer database. They returned to Abu Ghraib in October 2003, and the officials they spoke to at the prison informed the family they needed Wisam’s identification number to confirm whether he was in the prison. Wisam is the sole breadwinner in his family, which consists of his father, mother, four sisters and 2 brothers. His siblings are all under 18 years old. It is believed he may have been seized because he drove a red Volkswagen. The U.S.-led coalition believed that a red Volkswagen was connected to a bombing in August 2003, and subsequently all red Volkswagens and their drivers were rounded up.\(^6\)
Press Office refused to discuss the situation of the MEK detainees.\textsuperscript{66} No information regarding the policy basis for their segregation and the legal basis on which the MEK are being detained was provided.\textsuperscript{67}

From the outset of the war in Iraq into the occupation, the Administration has asserted the application of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict, but has failed to properly follow the Conventions.\textsuperscript{68} The Geneva Conventions, codifying the laws of war, apply in all international armed conflicts. Under the Geneva Conventions, there are two categories of individuals who can be detained by an occupying power: prisoners of war and civilians.\textsuperscript{69} Generally, prisoners of war are to be released at the end of active hostilities.\textsuperscript{70}

There are two narrow bases on which an occupying power can detain civilians: (1) if it is “necessary, for imperative reasons of security,” and (2) for penal prosecutions.\textsuperscript{71} The Conventions do not mention a separate category of “security detainees.” In addition, Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention permits detaining powers to deny persons rights of communication under the Convention where there is a “definite suspicion” of activities that are “hostile to the security” of the occupying power. The burden of definite suspicion is a high burden that must be individualized and not of a general nature.\textsuperscript{72} And the power to detain such persons is restricted to cases where “absolute military security so requires.”\textsuperscript{73} Even under these circumstances, all other protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention apply. In particular, Article 5 requires that such individuals “shall nevertheless be treated with humanity...[and] be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date” possible. The security of the occupying power does not empower the occupier to deprive such individuals of other protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention, such as the right to receive medical attention if necessary, the right to see a chaplain if the detainee was seriously ill, and the protection against torture.\textsuperscript{74}

The comprehensiveness of the ICRC’s access to all detention facilities is unclear. According to the ICRC’s 2004 report on Iraq, the ICRC has access to some of the detention facilities in Iraq, including Camp Cropper, Al Russafa, Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, as well as several temporary internment places such as Talil Airforce Base and detention facilities in Tikrit and Mosul.\textsuperscript{75} It is unclear whether the ICRC has access to additional facilities. Moreover, despite having granted the ICRC access to some facilities, the United States has denied the ICRC access to particular prisoners within those facilities. Indeed, some detainees have been moved in order to evade ICRC monitoring.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, the system created by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to inform families of detainees of their loved ones’ capture remains inadequate. As the New York Times reported in March on Iraqi experiences:

> Often they were led away in the middle of the night, with bags over their heads and no explanation. Many people have said that when they asked soldiers where their family members were being taken, they were told to shut up. A few hundred women have also been detained. And complicating the families’ searches, there are several major prisons and hundreds of smaller jails and bases across Iraq.\textsuperscript{77}

U.S. forces in conjunction with the CPA maintain a list of detainees in U.S. custody and provide the list to the ICRC.\textsuperscript{78} In addition, there is an Iraqi Assistance Center and nine General
Information Centers in Baghdad where lists are accessible. Those with an internet connection can access detainee information via the CPA website.

However, the list is not comprehensive in that it does not include detainees held at Mosul or Tikrit. It often does not contain full names of detainees; translation renders some names unrecognizable to family members; or the identification numbers for detainees do not correspond with the list. Many families are not in a position to travel to one of the centers in Baghdad to locate information. Moreover, the ICRC reports that capture cards, required for prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, containing biographical information were often incomplete, making it difficult for the ICRC to effectively notify families. Even when families are able to locate their loved ones in detention, military personnel cite the average wait time for obtaining a visit to be one month. In some cases obtaining a visit can take more than three months.

**Guantanamo Bay**

More is known about the detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay than virtually all other facilities. The detention facility there was opened in early 2002, when the U.S. military removed several hundred individuals from Afghanistan. As of April 2004, Guantanamo Bay housed 595 detainees, from approximately 40 countries. According to the Defense Department, 134 detainees have been released since the detention facility opened, and 12 others have been returned for continued detention in their home country.

Nonetheless, the numbers provided by the Administration raise concerns that the information regarding the number of detainees provided by the U.S. Government does not reveal the whole picture. For example, on July 18, 2003, the Department of Defense announced there were “approximately 660” detainees in Guantanamo, representing the net figure resulting from the release of 27 detainees and the new arrival of 10. From then until April 2, 2004, the Pentagon made eight additional official announcements, advising of further releases aggregating 78, and 20 new arrivals. Mathematically, this should have resulted in a net decrease of 58, leaving a total detainee population of 602. In fact, on that date, there were only 595 detainees on the base, according to the Department of Defense, leaving seven unaccounted for. While the releases of one Spaniard (on February 13,
II. The Known Unknowns

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2004) or one Dane (on February 25) or five Britons (on March 9) were publicly announced," there were seven other detainees whose release or transfer apparently did not merit official mention.

The uncertain status of those held at Guantanamo has also been the subject of widespread international concern. The President designated those detained at Guantanamo as “enemy” or “unlawful combatants,” a status with unclear legal meaning as it has been used by the Administration. A number of the detainees’ family members filed habeas corpus petitions in U.S. courts challenging the government’s authority to indefinitely detain prisoners without charge, and the U.S. Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision on the matter in late June.

In the meantime, the legal status of the Guantanamo detainees remains obscure. Under the Geneva Conventions, persons captured during an international armed conflict are either prisoners of war or civilians; both categories come with specific protections delineated in the Geneva Conventions. Prisoners of war are entitled, for example, to be treated humanely at all times, send and receive letters, and be free from physical or mental torture in the course of interrogations. Civilians who engage directly in combat are not entitled to prisoner-of-war protections, but are entitled to basic protections such as the right to be treated with humanity; unlike prisoners of war, they may also be prosecuted for the act of having taken up arms. If there is any doubt as to the status to which a detainee is entitled, he must be afforded a so-called Article 5 hearing to determine, on an individual basis, the rights to which he is entitled. None of the detainees currently held at Guantanamo has been afforded a standard Article 5 hearing. Indeed, as “unlawful combatants,” Guantanamo detainees have been afforded neither the protections under the Geneva Conventions, nor the protections of the U.S. criminal justice system, nor has any of the nearly 600 detainees yet been tried for crimes under the law of war.

Pakistan

Joint Pakistan and U.S. operations in the “war on terrorism” and the capture of suspects in Pakistan have raised suspicion of U.S. detention locations in Pakistan, particularly at Kohat and Alizai. In Spring 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement officials began aiding Pakistani officials in tracking Al-Qaeda and Taliban members within Pakistan. Press reports indicate that as of July 2003, Pakistani authorities detained and transferred to U.S. custody almost 500 individuals.

A number of press reports have indicated the use by the United States of a prison in Kohat, Pakistan, near the border of Afghanistan. Immediately following the war in Afghanistan, Pakistani authorities moved all “civilian” prisoners from the prison in Kohat, along with all prison records and staff. The prison in Kohat came to be used to hold suspected terrorists and Taliban members. In the first half of 2002, over 140 suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban members were moved to the Kohat prison. According to press reports, the Pakistani army maintained the external security of the prison, while U.S. officials were responsible for the internal security. U.S. interrogators questioned prisoners freely in Kohat and determined which among them to move to Guantanamo Bay. A number of people raised concerns at the treatment of the prisoners, including a local leader, Javed Ibrahim Paracha of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), who described prisoners, shackled and only in their shorts, being whisked onto military planes in the middle of the night.
In September 2003, the Pakistani press reported that U.S. officials were given authority over Kohat airport and that construction was planned for a special facility to house Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners. When questioned about this development, Director-General of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Shaukat Sultan denied that the Kohat airport was being handed over to the United States. The Department of Defense and the CIA refuse to confirm or deny the existence of detention facilities in Pakistan.

Diego Garcia

The U.S. Naval Base on the island of Diego Garcia is located in the Indian Ocean, 3,000 miles south of Iraq. Diego Garcia was established as part of the British Indian Ocean Territories. The United States leased the territory from the United Kingdom in 1966 for an initial period of 50 years. It was developed as a joint U.S. and U.K. air and naval refueling and support station during the Cold War and has since been used during the Persian Gulf War, Afghan War, and the recent war in Iraq. There are approximately 1,700 military personnel and 2,000 civilian contractors on the island. No one is allowed on the island unless they are military personnel or supporting military operations.

Pentagon officials have denied the existence of detention facilities at Diego Garcia housing individuals detained in the context of the “war on terrorism.” The CIA has refused to comment on whether there are detainees on Diego Garcia. U.K. officials have similarly denied assertions that detainees are being held by the United States on Diego Garcia. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Baroness Amos stated that there were no prisoners on Diego Garcia as of January 8, 2003, and later found questions of whether there were Taliban soldiers on Diego-Garcia to be “entirely without merit.” Nonetheless, the denials by the United States and Britain contradict repeated press reports indicating that at least some individuals have been detained on Diego Garcia, including, at one time, Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin), the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah.

Jordan

Investigative reporters have identified the Al Jafr Prison, in the southern desert, as a CIA interrogation facility. According to press reports, approximately 100 detainees have passed through the prison, including high level Al Qaeda leaders, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri. The CIA and the Pentagon have refused to confirm or deny the existence of any detention facilities in Jordan. Other sources have told us that at least one such facility exists.

United States

The U.S. Government is detaining at least three individuals as “enemy combatants” on U.S. soil: two U.S. citizens, Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, as well as Ali Saleh Kahl al-Marri, a Qatari national residing in the United States. They are all held at the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.

The legal status or rights held by these “enemy combatants” is now being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, which is expected to rule in the coming weeks on the legality of their detention. The President has designated Padilla, Hamdi and al-Marri “enemy combatants,” and deprived them of protection under the Geneva Conventions or under U.S. criminal law. In effect, the
President has reserved for himself the authority to deny those so labeled, regardless of citizenship, all legal rights and remedies, whether under international human rights or humanitarian law, U.S. criminal law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the U.S. Constitution.

The U.S. Government has likewise failed to provide information regarding the “enemy combatants.” Both Mr. Padilla and Mr. al-Marri were abruptly removed from the criminal justice system to military custody. In the case of Jose Padilla, he was originally provided a public defense attorney and his case was entered into the U.S. criminal justice system. While proceedings were pending, the President declared Mr. Padilla an “enemy combatant” and ordered him transported to a military brig in South Carolina – without informing his lawyer. There is no clear procedure for informing families that their loved one has been designated an “enemy combatant.” Both Mr. Padilla’s and Mr. al-Marri’s lawyers informed their respective families of their detention while they were still in the criminal justice system. As far as lawyers for Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri are aware, the U.S. Government did not officially inform their respective families.

The detainees’ access to the outside world has been limited. After nearly two years in incommunicado detention, both Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla were granted a visit with their lawyers (following the Supreme Court’s decision to hear their cases). In addition, the ICRC has been granted a visit to Mr. Padilla and Mr. Hamdi. Mr. al-Marri’s attorney does not know whether the ICRC has visited Mr. al-Marri.

U.S. Ships

In the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, a number of detainees were transferred and held for short periods of time on the USS Bataan and USS Peleliu. In January 2002, John Walker Lindh and David Hicks, along with a number of Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners were detained aboard the USS Bataan. Mr. Lindh was transferred to the USS Bataan on December 31, 2001 and remained there until January 22, 2002. Eight detainees were held on the USS Bataan during the same time period. Both Mr. Hicks and Mr. Lindh were detained on the USS Peleliu prior to being transferred to the USS Bataan. Mr. Lindh was transferred to the USS Peleliu on December 14, 2001. During that time, there were at least four additional detainees on board the USS Peleliu. The Defense Department has refused to confirm or deny whether any current detainees are being held onboard naval ships.
III. The Law

[There] may be instances arising in the future where persons are wrongfully detained in places unknown to those who would apply for habeas corpus in their behalf. . . . These dangers may seem unreal in the United States. But the experience of less fortunate countries should serve as a warning . . . .

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)

In its Country Reports on human rights conditions abroad, the U.S. Department of State has consistently criticized the practice of holding individuals incommunicado in secret detention facilities.137 For a nation founded on the principle of limited government, the reason for the criticism is not difficult to understand. As one federal court recently put it in rejecting the Government’s efforts to secretly deport certain individuals from the United States: “The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye, and behind a closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors.”138

For this reason, the major international treaties that govern the use of detention by the United States recognize the fundamental necessity of maintaining openness in government detention – whether of civilians or of prisoners of war, and whether they are detained in the course of international armed conflict or not. Moreover, longstanding U.S. law and policy reflect adherence to these obligations.

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United States ratified more than a decade ago, makes clear that all states parties have a duty to institute procedures that will minimize the risk of torture.139 At the top of the list of required procedures: maintaining officially recognized places of detention, keeping registers of all in custody, and disclosing the names of all individuals detained to their families and friends.140

To guarantee the effective protection of detained persons, provisions should be made for detainees to be held in places officially recognized as places of detention and for their names and places of detention, as well as for the names of persons responsible for their detention, to be kept in registers readily available and accessible to those concerned, including relatives and friends. To the same effect, the time and place of all interrogations
such requirements are imposed because prisoners are “particularly vulnerable persons,” who can easily become subject to abuse. In fact, incommunicado detention, especially by denying individuals contact with family and friends, violates the ICCPR’s obligation to treat prisoners with humanity. States are thus required to implement provisions “against incommunicado detention” that deter violations and ensure accountability.

The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the independent ICCPR monitoring body (whose members are human rights experts elected by states parties), has consistently recognized the import of these obligations. For example, in El-Megreisi v. Libya, the HRC found that the Libyan government in detaining an individual for six years, the last three of which incommunicado and at an unknown location, had violated the ICCPR’s prohibition of torture and its requirement that prisoners be treated with dignity. This, despite the fact that the family knew that the detainee was alive and his wife had been allowed to visit him once. The HRC nonetheless found that the detainee’s prolonged incommunicado imprisonment as well as the government’s refusal to disclose El-Megreisi’s whereabouts amounted both to arbitrary detention and to a state failure to minimize the risks of torture.

Under the Geneva Conventions

The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which the United States has signed and ratified, are the primary instruments of international humanitarian law protecting all those caught up in the course of armed conflict. The U.S. Government has generally taken the position that the Geneva Conventions apply in the U.S. armed conflict in Iraq. Despite this, both conflicting public statements, and internal Administration dispute over the applicability of these treaties, have left their role in these conflicts deeply unclear.

The Administration’s position regarding the Afghanistan conflict has been even less clear. In press statements in early January 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that as a matter of policy, but not of legal obligation, the United States intended to treat detainees from Afghanistan in a manner “reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions,” and would “generally” follow the Geneva Conventions, though only to “the extent that they are appropriate,” as “technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.” Following an internal review of this position at the urging of Secretary of State Colin Powell (who was concerned about the potential effect on U.S. forces of a blanket renunciation of the Geneva Conventions), the Administration modified its position slightly.

On February 7, 2002, White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer announced President Bush’s decision “that the Geneva Convention applies to members of the Taliban militia, but not to members of the international al-Qaida terrorist network.” Despite the stated application of the Conventions, however, the Administration determined that Taliban fighters were not eligible for prisoner-of-war status because the government had violated international humanitarian law; this allegation had never previously stopped the United States from affording enemy government forces prisoner-of-war protections.

The U.S. obligation to record and account for prisoners of war, defined under the Third Geneva Convention, is clear. Prisoners of war are to be documented, and their whereabouts and health conditions made available to family members and to the country of origin of the prisoner.
Fourth Geneva Convention (governing the treatment of civilians) establishes virtually identical procedures for the documentation and disclosure of information concerning civilian detainees. These procedures are meant to ensure that “[i]nternment . . . is not a measure of punishment and so the persons interned must not be held incommunicado.”

The disclosure required by the Geneva Conventions is done in the first instance through a system of capture cards. “Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other hand, a card . . . informing his relatives of his capture, address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner.” (The United States’ failure to observe the capture card system in Iraq was the subject of ICRC criticism in its recently leaked 2004 report.)

The Central Agency described in Article 123 is a body meant to be established in a neutral country whose purpose is “to collect all the information it may obtain through official or private channels respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power on which they depend.” The ICRC has historically established the Central Agency and “[w]henever a conflict has occurred since the Second World War, the International Committee has placed the Agency at the disposal of the belligerents, and the latter have accepted its services.”

U.S. Domestic Law and Policy

The U.S. government has long-standing rules requiring the disclosure to the ICRC of detainee information as well as the provision of ICRC access to prisoners, in order to ensure that U.S. Geneva Conventions obligations have been fulfilled. This policy is enshrined in binding military regulations and field manuals dating back half a century.

Defense Department Directive 2310.1 – currently in force – affirms the United States’ obligation to comply with the Geneva Conventions and establishes a framework for information disclosure. Under this Directive, the Secretary of the Army must develop plans for “the treatment, care, accountability, legal status, and administrative procedures to be followed about personnel captured or detained by, or transferred from the care, custody, and control of, the U.S. Military Services.” In particular, the Secretary of the Army is required to plan and operate a prisoner of war and civilian internment information center to comply with the United States’ Geneva Convention obligations (described above), and “serve to account for all persons who pass through the care, custody, and control of the U.S. Military Services.” The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (a position currently held by Doug Feith) has “primary staff responsibility” for overseeing the detainee program.

To implement its obligations under Article 122 of the Third Geneva Convention, requiring each detaining power to establish a national information bureau, and to fulfill Directive 2310.1, the Army established the National Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC). According to binding Army Regulation 190-8, the NPWIC is charged with maintaining records for both POWs and detained civilians. The center functioned during the 1991 Gulf War, and has been used in subsequent U.S. military operations. As an information processor, the NPWIC ensures full
accountability for persons who fall into U.S. hands. It does not make decisions regarding whether an individual is entitled to prisoner-of-war or other legal status.\textsuperscript{164}

As recently as last April, W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to the Army JAG, maintained that the NPWIC would be employed in Iraq: “Once the theater processing is accomplished, those reports are sent back here to the National Prisoner of War Information Center, which is run under the Army Operations Center. Those lists are all collated, put together and we ensure that we have proper identification, the best information we can get from that. And thereafter, that information is forwarded by the United States government to the International Committee of the Red Cross.”\textsuperscript{165}

In his report, General Taguba noted that such regulations had not been fully complied with, since the reporting systems – such as the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and the Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) – which traditionally provide information to the NPWIC were “underutilized and often [did] not give a ‘real time’ accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.”\textsuperscript{166} Repeated efforts by Human Rights Firsts to contact the Department of the Army, Office of Public Affairs, in order to clarify the status of the center and the use of these reporting systems were not answered.

Finally, since 1956, the Army’s field manual has explicitly recognized the ICRC’s right to detainee information and access, and its special role in ensuring Geneva Conventions compliance. The manual stipulates: “The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.”\textsuperscript{167} The Navy’s operations handbook likewise authorizes the ICRC to monitor “the treatment of prisoners of war, interned civilians, and the inhabitants of occupied territory.”\textsuperscript{168} It describes the ICRC’s special status and access to detainees:

[The ICRC’s] principal purpose is to provide protection and assistance to the victims of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions recognize the special status of the ICRC and have assigned specific tasks for it to perform, including visiting and interviewing prisoners of war, providing relief to the civilian population of occupied territories, searching for information concerning missing persons, and offering its “good offices” to facilitate the establishment of hospital and safety zones.\textsuperscript{169}

Army regulations make even more explicit the rights of detainees, both civilians and combatants, to contact the ICRC and ensure adequate access and disclosure. With respect to detained combatants, prisoner representatives have right to correspond with the ICRC.\textsuperscript{170} Similar internee committees representing detained civilians also have rights to unlimited correspondence with the ICRC. “Members of the Internee Committee will be accorded postal and telegraphic facilities for communicating with . . . the International Committee of the Red Cross and its Delegates. . . . These communications will be unlimited.”\textsuperscript{171}
IV. The Purpose Behind the Law

It will reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general.

Secretary of State Colin Powell
Internal Memorandum on Effects of Disregarding Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan
January 26, 2002

Current U.S. detention and interrogation practices undermine both the protection of human rights, and U.S. national security interests. As described above, the United States has failed to meet its obligation to keep registers of all in custody, and to disclose the names of all individuals detained to their families and friends. The United States has also failed to fulfill its obligation under longstanding U.S. policy and law to afford the ICRC unfettered access to all detainees held in the course of armed conflict. And the United States has failed to afford every individual in its custody some recognized legal status – some human rights – under law.

These laws were enacted in part to meet essential policy objectives. As we have seen vividly demonstrated in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, unregulated and unmintermed detention and interrogation practices invite torture and abuse. These abuses put the United States’ own forces abroad at greater risk of the same kinds of torture. These illegal practices also seriously undermine the United States’ ability to “win the hearts and minds” of the global community – a goal essential to defeating terrorism over the long term. This chapter discusses the basis for those concerns.

Current Practice Sets Conditions for Torture & Abuse

All I want to say is that there was “before” 9/11 and “after” 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off.

Former CIA Counterterrorism Director Cofer Black
Testimony to the Joint House and Select Intelligence Committee
September 26, 2002

When governments cloak detention in a veil of secrecy, by holding prisoners incommunicado or at undisclosed locations, the democratic system of public accountability cannot function. As former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Nigel Rodley has written, the more hidden detention
practices there are, the more likely that “all legal and moral constraint on official behavior [will be] removed.”

These concerns have produced a series of international standards governing detention, expressed in the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Standard Minimum Rules) and the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of Principles). In order to maintain public accountability and minimize the chance for abuse, international law requires families to be notified of both arrest and detainee whereabouts. For the same reason, governments must hold detainees only in publicly recognized detention centers and maintain updated registers of all prisoners. By ensuring that state detention practices are subject to public scrutiny, these disclosure requirements constrain state violence and provide basic safeguards for prisoner treatment.

Without these protections, the safety and dignity of prisoners are left exclusively to the discretion of the detaining power – circumstances that have repeatedly produced brutal consequences. For instance, during Saddam Hussein’s rule of Iraq, secrecy was an essential component of detention practices. Individuals were arbitrarily arrested; tracing their whereabouts was a virtual impossibility. As Amnesty International reported in 1994: “Usually families of the ‘disappeared’ remain[ed] ignorant of their fate until they [were] either released or confirmed to have been executed.” Thus, in the March 1991 uprising after the first Gulf War, “opposition forces broke into prisons and detention centers” across northern and southern Iraq and released hundreds of prisoners “held in secret underground detention centres with no entrance or exit visible.”

The United States’ own recent experiences in Iraq provide a more apt case in point. As widely publicized reports now make clear, U.S. detention officials have used various prohibited interrogation techniques on Iraqi prisoners, including manipulating detainees’ diets, imposing prolonged isolation, using military dogs for intimidation, and forcing detainees to maintain “stress positions” for prolonged periods. These practices violate U.S. and international law, and a thorough internal Army investigation report documenting their use circulated within the U.S. Government in February 2004. Yet according to press accounts, these practices continued “until a scandal erupted in May over photographs depicting abuse at the prison.”

Policies of secrecy and non-disclosure have also made subsequent investigations into wrongdoing – and efforts to hold violators accountable – more difficult. Investigations into reports of abuse and even deaths of detainees in custody have been scattered and insufficient. For example, the New York Times has reported on two deaths in U.S. custody at Bagram Air Force that occurred in December 2002; according to the Times, the Army pathologist’s report indicated the cause of death was “homicide,” a result of “blunt force injuries to lower extremities complicating coronary artery disease.” Despite multiple requests from Human Rights First and other human rights organizations, the Pentagon has refused to disclose any information on how, or even whether, it was investigating these deaths. Recently leaked Army reports indicate that the investigation into the deaths continues, and that the crimes remain unsolved nearly a year and a half later.

Such experiences give added import to international disclosure requirements regarding detention practices. They also make the failure of the United States to disclose detainees’
whereabouts or numbers particularly disconcerting. By keeping its practices hidden from view, the United States created conditions ripe for the torture and abuse now in evidence.

**Current Practice Undermines Protections for Americans Abroad**

*It is critical to realize that the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions do not endanger American soldiers, they protect them. Our soldiers enter battle with the knowledge that should they be taken prisoner, there are laws intended to protect them and impartial international observers to inquire after them.*

Senator John McCain

Wall Street Journal Commentary
June 1, 2004

The United States’ official compliance with the Geneva Conventions since World War II has been animated by several powerful concerns that remain equally important in the struggle against terror. First and foremost is the belief that American observance of rule-of-law protections drives our enemies to reciprocate in their treatment of American troops and civilians caught up in conflicts overseas. As the U.S. Senate recognized in ratifying the Conventions:

> If the end result [of ratification] is only to obtain for Americans caught in the maelstrom of war a treatment which is 10 percent less vicious than what they would receive without these conventions, if only a few score of lives are preserved because of the efforts at Geneva, then the patience and laborious work of all who contributed to that goal will not have been in vain.185

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed that American “participation is needed to . . . enable us to invoke [the Geneva Conventions] for the protection of our nationals.”186 And Senator Mike Mansfield added that while American “standards are already high”:

> The conventions point the way to other governments. Without any real cost to us, acceptance of the standards provided for prisoners of war, civilians, and wounded and sick will insure improvement of the condition of our own people.187

The fundamental self-interest behind ratification of the Geneva Conventions has proven effective in conflicts preceding the “war on terrorism.” General Eisenhower, for example, explained that the Western Allies treated German prisoners in accordance with the principles of international humanitarian law because “the Germans had some thousands of American and British prisoners and I did not want to give Hitler the excuse or justification for treating our prisoners more harshly than he already was doing.”188

During the Vietnam War, North Vietnam publicly asserted that all American POWs were war criminals, and hence not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.189 Still, the United States applied the Geneva Conventions’ principles to all enemy prisoners of war – both North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong – in part to try to ensure “reciprocal benefits for American captives.”190 U.S. military experts have made clear their belief that American adherence to the Geneva Conventions in Vietnam saved American lives:

> [A]pplying the benefits of the Convention to those combat captives held in South Vietnam did enhance the opportunity for survival of U.S. service members held by the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. While the enemy never officially acknowledged the applicability of the Geneva Convention, and treatment of American POWs continued to be brutal, more U.S. troops were surviving capture. Gone were the days when an American advisor was beheaded, and his head displayed on a pole by the Viet Cong. On the contrary, the humane treatment afforded Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army prisoners exerted constant pressure on the enemy to reciprocate, and the American POWs who came home in 1973 survived, at least in part, because of [that].

The United States government’s allegiance to basic international law obligations continued during the 1991 Gulf War, in which the United States armed forces readily afforded full protection under the Geneva Conventions to the more than 86,000 Iraqi POWs in its custody.

It is in large measure for their effectiveness in protecting America’s own that many former American prisoners of war today support the United States government’s adherence to the principles of the Geneva Conventions that helped protect them. As Senator (and former prisoner of war) John McCain has explained:

> The Geneva Conventions and the Red Cross were created in response to the stark recognition of the true horrors of unbounded war. And I thank God for that. I am thankful for those of us whose dignity, health and lives have been protected by the Conventions . . . . I am certain we all would have been a lot worse off if there had not been the Geneva Conventions around which an international consensus formed about some very basic standards of decency that should apply even amid the cruel excesses of war.

Senator McCain recently reaffirmed his belief that our failure to abide by our own obligations puts our troops in danger abroad: “While our intelligence personnel in Abu Ghraib may have believed that they were protecting U.S. lives by roughing up detainees to extract information, they have had the opposite effect. Their actions have increased the danger to American soldiers, in this conflict and in future wars.”

Commenting on recent events in the “war on terrorism,” former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam (and former prisoner of war) Pete Peterson agreed, explaining: “There can be no doubt that the Vietnamese while consistently denying any responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the Geneva Accords, nevertheless tended to follow those rules which resulted in many more of us returning home than would have otherwise been the case.”

**Current Practice Undermines American “Soft Power” in the World**

*Detention can induce fear, isolation and hopelessness.*

Physicians for Human Rights

*From Persecution to Prison: The Health Consequences of Detention for Asylum Seekers*

June 2002

The United States’ practices in its global network of detention facilities also has a deeply negative effect on the U.S. ability to combat the threat of terrorism. As national security experts have pointed out, military power is only one of a set of tools in the nation’s toolbox to reduce the chances of more terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Other critical tools – what some have called “soft power” – include diplomatic and economic measures, cultural and educational exchange,
and the ability to credibly leverage moral and popular authority. This last tool depends critically on visible demonstration that the United States deeds match its words in supporting democracy and human rights.

The extent to which the United States’ detention practices represent a failure in this regard is in painful evidence when one compares the Administration’s statements to recent revelations about acts of torture by U.S. personnel:

- On March 23, 2003, after American soldiers were captured and abused in Iraq, the United States condemned Iraqi treatment of American prisoners as violating the Geneva Conventions and contrasted it to the United States’ own treatment of prisoners it had taken. President Bush demanded that American prisoners “be treated humanely . . . just like we’re treating the prisoners that we have captured humanely.”

- On March 23, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz also invoked the Geneva Conventions when objecting to Iraqi treatment of U.S. prisoners: “We’ve seen those scenes on Al Jazeera that others have seen. We have reminded the Iraqis . . . that there are very clear obligations under the Geneva Convention to treat prisoners humanely . . . We treat our own prisoners, and there are hundreds of Iraqi prisoners, extremely well.”

- On June 26, 2003, President Bush affirmed the United States’ commitment not to torture security suspects or interrogate them in a manner that would constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.”

- On April 28, 2004, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement how the Court could be sure that government interrogators were not torturing detainees in U.S. custody. Clement insisted that the Court would just have to “trust the executive to make the kind of quintessential military judgments that are involved in things like that.”

The Administration’s words are admirable. But the deeds resulting from its policies have engendered deep uncertainty, fear, and anger among the many in the Muslim world. As Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, chief spokesman for the U.S. military in Iraq, recently acknowledged: “The evidence of abuse inside Abu Ghraib has shaken public opinion in Iraq to the point where it may be more difficult than ever to secure cooperation against the insurgency, that winning over Iraqis before the planned handover of some sovereign powers next month had been made considerably harder by the photos.”

The effect of U.S. secrecy and failure to communicate regarding policies of detention has deeply alienated the families of those detained. As the New York Times reported of some of the families of Iraqi detainees:

Sabrea Kudi cannot find her son. He was taken by American soldiers nearly nine months ago, and there has been no trace of him since. “I’m afraid he’s dead,” Ms. Kudi said. Lara Waad cannot find her husband. He was arrested in a raid, too. “I had God – and I had him,” she said. “Now I am alone.” . . . Ms. Kudi, whose son, Muhammad, was detained nearly nine months ago, has been to Abu Ghraib more than 20 times. The huge prison is the center of her continuing odyssey through military bases, jails, assistance...
centers, hospitals and morgues. She said she had been shoved by soldiers and chased by dogs. “If they want to kill me, kill me,” Ms. Kudi said. “Just give me my son.”

Recent polls by the Coalition Provisional Authority show that about 80 percent of Iraqis view U.S. troops unfavorably. More significant, Muslim clerics now regularly rail against the United States for the abuse of Iraqi captives at Abu Ghraib prison. As one Muslim preacher was recently quoted saying: “No one can ask them what they are doing, because they are protected by their freedom. . . . No one can punish them, whether in our country or their country. The worst thing is what was discovered in the course of time: abusing women, children, men, and the old men and women whom they arrested randomly and without any guilt. They expressed the freedom of rape, the freedom of nudity and the freedom of humiliation.”

Finally, U.S. policies that promote secrecy and lack of accountability have encouraged authoritarian regimes around the globe to commit abuses in the name of counterterrorism – abuses that undermine efforts to promote democracy and human rights. These regimes self-consciously invoke the very language the United States uses to justify such security policies in order to suppress lawful dissent and quell political opposition in their own countries. To cite a few examples:

- In Egypt (where President Mubarak has endorsed a diminished post-September 11 concept of the “freedom of the individual”);
- In Liberia (where former President Taylor ordered a critical journalist declared an “enemy combatant”; the journalist was subsequently jailed and tortured);
- In Zimbabwe (where President Mugabe, while voicing agreement with the Bush Administration’s policies in the “war on terrorism,” declared foreign journalists and others critical of his regime “terrorists” and suppressed their work);
- In Eritrea (where the governing party arrested 11 political opponents, has held them incommunicado and without charge, and defended its actions as being consistent with United States actions after September 11); and
- In China (where the Chinese government charged a peaceful political activist with terrorism and sentenced him to life in prison, leading the U.S. State Department to note “with particular concern the charge of terrorism in this case, given the apparent lack of evidence [and] due process”).

The United States is losing the critical moral high ground that is essential to achieving success against terror; we are now used as an example of unchecked government power by the most repressive regimes in the world.
V. Ending Secret Detentions

The revelations that have emerged about U.S. policy and practice of detention and interrogation in the “war on terrorism” are deeply disturbing. While the United States of course has legitimate interests in keeping some information secret, there is no legitimate security interest in failing to provide a baseline accounting to Congress, the ICRC, and the families of those detained of the number, nationality, legal status, and general location of all those the United States currently holds.

Human Rights First thus calls on the Bush Administration to take the following critical steps:

1. Disclose to Congress and the ICRC the location of all U.S.-controlled detention facilities worldwide, and provide a regular accounting of: the number of detainees, their nationality, and the legal basis on which they are being held.
2. Order a thorough, comprehensive, and independent investigation of all U.S.-controlled detention facilities, and submit the findings of the investigation to Congress.
3. Take all necessary steps to inform the immediate families of those detained of their loved ones’ capture, location, legal status, and condition of health.
4. Immediately grant the ICRC unrestricted access to all detainees being held by the United States in the course of the global “war on terrorism.”
5. Publicly reject assertions by Administration lawyers that domestic and international prohibitions on torture and cruelty do not apply to the President in the exercise of his commander-in-chief authority.
6. Investigate and prosecute all those who carried out acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of U.S. and international law, as well as those officials who ordered, approved or tolerated these acts.
7. Publicly disclose the status of all pending investigations into allegations of mistreatment of detainees and detainee deaths in custody.
VI. Partial List of Letters and Inquiries by Human Rights First Since June 2003


Endnotes

6 International Committee of the Red Cross, Operational Update: “U.S. detention related to the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath - the role of the ICRC,” May 14, 2004, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/lopList454/73596F146DA81A08C1256E940469F48. (“The ICRC is especially concerned about the fact that the US detains an unknown number of people outside any legal framework. Many of those captured in the context of the so-called War on Terror are being held at US detention facilities in Bagram, Afghanistan and in Guantnamo Bay, Cuba. A small number of persons are furthermore detained in Charleston, USA. According to public statements by official US sources, a number of detainees are also being held incommunicado at undisclosed locations. The ICRC has been visiting detainees in Bagram and Guantnamo Bay, as well as in Charleston. The ICRC has also repeatedly appealed to the American authorities for access to people detained in undisclosed locations.”)


10 See, e.g., Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross On The Treatment By The Coalition Forces Of Prisoners Of War And Other Protected Persons By The Geneva Conventions In Iraq During Arrest, Interment And Interrogation, February 2004, Section 1.1.9, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/icrc_report_iraq_feb2004.htm [hereinafter “ICRC Iraq Report”] (discussing the U.S. government’s failure to adequately maintain the system of capture cards, legally mandated under the Geneva Conventions) (“Since March 2003 capture cards have often been filled out carelessly, resulting in unnecessary delays of several weeks or months before families were notified, and sometimes resulting in no notification at all. . . . The ICRC has raised this issue repeatedly with the detaining authorities since March 2003, including at the highest levels of the OF in August 2003.”)


16 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (August 4, 1822), in 9 James Madison’s Writings 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).


23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
41 Paracha Interview, supra, note 38.
43 June 11 CPIC Interview, supra, note 42.
44 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
50 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Background on U.S. Detention Facilities in Iraq, available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/07/iraq8560.htm. (listing Tallil Air Force Base, Al-Rusafa, Al- Kadhimiyya, Al-Karkh, and Camp Falcon all near or in Baghdad, Al- Diwaniyya, a detention facility in Mosul, and the Ashraf Camp). Camp Ashraf is reportedly where detained members of Mujahideen-E-Khalq (MEK), an Iraqi based organization seeking to overthrow the government in Iran, are being held.
Ending Secret Detentions

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75 ICRC Iraq Report, supra, note 10.


84 Ibid.


38 — Ending Secret Detentions


100 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, August 12, 1949, art. 5, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fe854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68 (accessed June 14, 2004).


119 Ibid.


123 See Brief of Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Supreme Court, March 2004, 03-1027.

124 See ibid.

125 Human Rights First Email Interview with Andrew Patel, June 11, 2004; Human Rights First Email interview with Mark Berman, June 11, 2004.

126 Human Rights First Email Interview with Andrew Patel, June 11, 2004; Human Rights First Email Interview with Mark Berman, June 11, 2004; Human Rights First Email Interview with Geremy Kamens, June 14, 2004.


129 Email interview with Mark Berman, Mr. al-Marri’s lawyer, June 11, 2004.


133 “Hicks’ ship docks in Fremantle on rest visit,” AAP Newsfeed, Jan. 27, 2002.


135 “Hicks’ ship docks in Fremantle on rest visit,” AAP Newsfeed, Jan. 27, 2002.


137 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).

138 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 7 (1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (accessed June 10, 2004) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).

139 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 7 (1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (accessed June 10, 2004) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
144 El-Megreisi v. Libya (440/1990); ICCPR, Arts. 7, 10. Paragraph 1 of Article 10 reads, "All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." The HRC has also held that incommunicado detention of longer than eight months amounts to inhumane treatment that breaches Article 7. *Shaw v. Jamaica* (704/96).

145 Likewise, the HRC has found that because the state had failed to take disclosure measures that would have prevented the disappearance of the victim, the Committee would assume a strong likelihood that torture or ill-treatment had occurred. "The State party has not denied that Rafael Mojica (a) has in fact disappeared and remains unaccounted for . . . and (b) that his disappearance was caused by individuals belonging to the Government’s security forces." *Mojica v. Dominican Republic* (449/91), 5.6.


147 Last September, Brig. Gen. Karpinski said that the United States was holding thousands of prisoners in Iraq who did not “fit into any category,” and that “We got an order from the secretary of defence (Donald Rumsfeld) to categorise” them. As a result, the label of “security detainee” was created, which as of mid-September covered 4,400 detainees. "U.S. holding 4,000 ‘extra’ detainees." *Agence France-Presse*, Sept. 16, 2003, available at http://dawn.com/2003/09/17/int6.htm (accessed June 11, 2004). According to the AFP: "Asked if they had any rights or had access to their families or legal help while they were being ‘secured,’ she said: ‘It’s not that they don’t have rights ... They have fewer rights than EPWs (enemy prisoners of war).’ But she added that they had not requested any such privileges." *Ibid*.


160 *Ibid.*, 4.2.3, 4.2.4. The Secretary is also required to report to the Defense Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other U.S. Government Agencies, and the ICRC on compliance with the Geneva Conventions. *Ibid.*, 4.2.5.

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161 Ibid., 4.1.1
163 Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees § 1-7 (1997).
169 Ibid., 6.2.2.
170 Army Regulation 190-8, § 3-5(d)(b).
171 Ibid., 6.4(f).
176 UN Body of Principles, Principle 12; Standard Minimum Rules, Rules 4, 7, 95.
179 Ibid.


183 See, e.g., Letter to Major General John R. Vines (cc: Donald Rumsfeld) from Elisa Massimino, June 25, 2003; Letter to Lieutenant General John R. Vines (cc: Donald Rumsfeld, William Haynes) from Elisa Massimino, Nov. 12, 2003. These and other letters are reprinted in an Appendix to this report.


188 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe 469 (1949).

189 Laws of War at 62 n.100.


